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Curing Washington's Occupational Disease
Statute: Dennis v. Department of Labor
and Industries
I. INTRODUCTION'
Under Washington's Industrial Insurance Act,2 a disabled
worker is eligible to receive disability benefits3 if the worker's
disability arises from what can either be defined as a work-
related injury4 or an occupational disease.' Because of these
definitions, Washington's treatment of work-related disability
claims is unique in comparison to the differing approaches
taken by other states.' In most other states, the definitions of
1. The author would like to thank the lawyers and staff members of the Tacoma,
Washington firm of Small, Snell, Logue & Weiss, P.S., who, through their advice and
support, contributed to this Note.
2. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51 (1987).
3. See Lenk v. Department of Labor and Indus., 3 Wash. App. 977, 478 P.2d 761
(1970). A worker is also entitled to receive treatment benefits if, as a result of an
injury or occupational disease, he has a physical or mental condition that requires
medical attention. This is regardless of whether there is any disability. Thus, an injury
resulting in a cut finger would give rise to a claim for benefits. Treatment benefits
would be given if the cut required medical treatment, i.e., stitches. Unless the cut
rendered the worker unable to work (for any period of time exceeding three days) or
resulted in permanent dysfunction, there would be a condition for which medical
benefits would be payable, but no compensable disability. Therefore, even if a worker
has suffered an injury or an occupational disease, disability benefits will not beprovided unless the worker is disabled as a result of the injury or occupational disease.
For ease of discussion, however, all references to entitlement in this Note will be
limited to disability benefits. Disability benefits are payable for permanent total
disability (WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.060 (1987)), temporary total disability (WASH. REV.
CODE § 51.32.090 (1987)), and permanent partial disability (WASH. REV. CODE
§ 52.32.080 (1987)).
4. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.08.100 (1987). "Injury" means a sudden and tangible
happening, of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and
occurring from without, and such physical conditions as result therefrom.
5. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987). "Occupational disease" means such disease
or infection as arises naturally and proximately out of employment under the
mandatory or elective adoption provisions of this title.
6. See generally 4 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION app. A,
Tables 2-2A (1987) [hereinafter LARSON]. Approximately half of the states have
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injury and occupational disease overlap and dovetail, thereby
allowing all work-related disabilities to fall into one of the two
categories.' In Washington, however, the injury and occupa-
tional disease statutes have been so narrowly interpreted that
until very recently there existed a gap in workers' compensa-
tion coverage.' Into this gap between compensable injuries and
compensable occupational diseases fell two kinds of work-
related disabilities that the Department of Labor and Indus-
tries9 would not cover: (1) disability caused by work-related
repetitive trauma10 and (2) disability caused by an occupational
disease aggravation of an ordinary disease of life or nonwork-
comprehensive statutes wherein injuries and occupational diseases are not
distinguished as such and are treated jointly under the generic label of "personal
injury." The comprehensive approach also has been embraced by Congress in the form
of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C. § 902(2)
(1982). The remainder of the states vary in their statutory treatment of injuries and
occupational diseases, some broadly defining "injury" and separately enumerating
occupational diseases, others narrowly defining "injury" as an "unexpected accident"
and separately passing "catch-all" statutes wherein all but the most common ailments
might be considered to be occupational diseases. The states that exclude coverage for
ordinary diseases of life are as follows: ALA. CODE § 25-5-1 (1986); ARIZ. STAT. ANNO.
§ 23-901 (1983); COLO. STAT. ANNO. § 8-41-108 (1986); CONN. STAT. ANNO. § 31-275
(1986); FLA. STAT. ANNO. § 440.01 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-801 (1983); IND. STAT.
ANNO. § 22-3-7-10 (1986); IOWA CODE ANNO. § 85.2 & 85.61 (1983); KANS. STAT. ANNO.
§ 44-01 (1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANNO. 152 § 1 (1988 Supp.); MICH. LAWS. ANNO.
§ 418.161 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANNO. § 176.011 (1988 Supp.); Mo. STAT. ANNO. § 287.067
(1988 Supp.); NEB. STAT. § 48.151 (1984); N.C. STAT. § 97.52 (1985); N.D. CODE § 65-01-02
(1987 Supp.); OHIO CODE ANNO. § 4123.01 (1980); OKLA. STAT. ANNO. 85 § 3 (1988
Supp.); OR. STAT. § 656.003 (1987); S.C. CODE ANNO. § 42-11-10 (1988); S.D. CODE. LAWS
§ 62-8-1 (1978); TEx. STAT. ART. 8306 § 20 (1988 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANNO. § 35-2-1, 12,
27 (1988 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANNO. T.21 § 601 (1978); VA. CODE § 65.1-46 (1987); W. VA.
CODE ANNO. § 23-4-1 (1985); Wyo. STAT. ANNO. § 27-14-102 (1987). For more
information on the workers' compensation schemes in other states, see also Comment,
The Ordinary Disease Exclusion in Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act: Where is
it Going After Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean?, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 161 (1983). The generic
"personal injury" method was adopted by drafters of the Model Act. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION LAW (Revised) § 2(a) (1977).
7. See supra note 6 for different approaches to the same problem of defining
compensable work-related disabilities.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 49-84.
9. The Department of Labor and Industries is the administrative agency charged
with carrying out the provisions of the Industrial Insurance Act. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 51.04.020 (1987).
10. For the purpose of this Note, repetitive trauma shall be defined as physical
traumas (e.g. jolts or bumps) happening over an extended period of time, caused from
external sources and that, cumulatively, result in a disabling physical condition. This
is the author's definition. It is drawn from the supreme court's ruling in Dennis v.
Department of Labor and Indus., 109 Wash. 2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). In that case,
it was found that a valid workers' compensation claim could be had for a disabling




Recently, in Dennis v. Department of Labor and Indus-
tries,2 the Washington Supreme Court had occasion to take a
fresh look at Washington's occupational disease statute.13
After reviewing the legislative history of the Industrial Insur-
ance Act,"4 the past judicial treatment of the occupational dis-
ease statute,' 5 and the general policy concerns attendant to
disability coverage in Washington,' 6 the court created a fair
and workable test for determining whether a worker's disabil-
ity is compensable as an occupational disease.'7 In so doing,
the Dennis court also eliminated the prior judicial standard
that kept repetitive traumas and occupational disease aggrava-
tions of ordinary diseases from giving rise to compensable
claims for workers' compensation benefits.'6 Thus, the court
11. For the purpose of this Note, the author has defined "aggravation" to mean "to
make worse to the extent that treatment is required or disability results." This
definition is loosely derived from McDougle v. Department of Labor and Indus., 64
Wash. 2d 640, 393 P.2d 631 (1964); Bennett v. Department of Labor and Indus., 48
Wash. 2d 553, 295 P.2d 310 (1956). See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.160 (1987) for the
statutory basis. An "ordinary disease of life" is defined by the author as any organic or
mental condition whose origin is not work-related with "not work-related" meaning
that the preexisting condition was not originally caused by the same employment that
aggravated the preexisting condition. This definition is loosely derived from the
Dennis case. See Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 471-76, 745 P.2d at 1298-1300. See also
LARSON, supra note 6, at § 41.33.
12. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 467, 745 P.2d at 1295.
13. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987).
14. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51 (1987); Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 489-71, 745 P.2d at
1297-99.
15. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987); Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 471-84, 745 P.2d
at 1288-1304.
16. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 471-84, 785 P.2d at 1288-1304.
17. Id. at 481, 745 P.2d at 1303. The court stated that for a worker to establish that
he has an occupational disease, he must prove that his disability was proximately
caused by his particular employment. Moreover, he must establish that his condition
was more probably-than-not caused by distinctive conditions of his employment, as
opposed to conditions of everyday life.
18. Id. at 472, 745 P.2d at 1298. Prior to the decision in Dennis, repetitive traumas
resulting in disability had not been allowed as compensable injuries. Because of the
repetitive nature, such an etiology can never fit within the narrow time-specific
language of the injury statute. Garrett Freightlines v. Department of Labor and
Indus., 45 Wash. App. 335, 725 P.2d 463 (1986). But repetitive traumas causing
disability had not been recognized as compensable occupational diseases by the
Department of Labor and Industries either. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES
WORKERS' COMPENSATION MANUAL: A GUIDE TO CLAIMS ADJUDICATION IN
WASHINGTON STATE B-18-19 (1987) (hereinafter MANUAL). Other jurisdictions have,
under certain circumstances peculiar to their own workers' compensation systems,
provided benefits to workers disabled by repetitive traumas. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co.
v. Fooks, 238 Ark. 815, 310 S.W.2d 816 (1958) (compensation given to a worker who
developed bursitis due to continued sitting on the job); Bondar v. Simmons Co.. 20 NJ.
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effectively closed the gap in coverage that had allowed the
Department of Labor and Industries to deny benefits to work-
ers whose disabilities, although work-related, could not be ster-
eotyped as injuries or occupational diseases. 9
This Note focuses on the current state of occupational dis-
ease coverage under the workers' compensation system in
Washington, and will review the legislative history,20  the
administrative interpretation,2' and the judicial development
of the occupational disease law.22 Further, after setting forth
the broad policy goals behind the Industrial Insurance Act
23
and outlining Washington's occupational disease statute,24 this
Note will conclude with a discussion of the supreme court's
analytical framework for a fair, workable, and uniform method
for adjudicating occupational disease claims in Washington.25
Super. 14T, 89 A.2d 299 (1952) (compensation given to a worker who developed bursitis
due to pushing and pulling a lever 500 to 700 times a day); Kalce v. Dewey Product, 296
Mich. 540, 296 N.W. 826 (1941) (compensation given to a worker who developed bursitis
due to a particular method that the worker used to fill bottles).
19. See Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987) (where a worker with a
disability caused by repetitive trauma was found to have a compensable occupational
disease). The problem of distinguishing between injuries and occupational diseases is
avoided in those states that have general personal injury statutes. See supra note 6 for
an enumeration of such states. For an interesting case showing the difficulty that
sometimes arises when it is necessary to distinguish between an injury and a disease,
see Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N.Y. 83, 147 N.E. 366 (1925). In that case, an
embalmer, who had touched a gangrenous corpse, made the mistake of scratching a
pimple on the back of his own neck, thereby transmitting the infection to himself.
The issue before the court was whether the embalmer sustained an injury or
developed an occupational disease.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 26-48.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 49-84.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 85-161.
23. WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51 (1987). For a statement of the goals of the Industrial
Insurance Act, see infra notes 26-48.
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987). See infra notes 26-48 and notes 85-176
and accompanying text.
25. When the current version of the occupational disease statute was passed in
1941, a Washington law student wrote that "[w]ho can say what meaning will be given
the key adverbs, 'naturally and proximately,' and when, for that matter, does a disease
'arise out of employment?' Only a series of supreme court decisions can furnish
reliable answers." Note, Workmens' Compensation, 16 WASH. L. REV. 153, 155 (1941)
[hereinafter Workmens' Compensation]. Ironically enough, as the author of this Note
will point out, it took 46 years to get a reliable answer in the form of the Dennis
decision. Dennis, 100 Wash. 2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987).
Occupational Disease
II. THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY AND
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE LAW IN WASHINGTON STATE
Like other states,26 Washington enacted its first workers'
compensation legislation in an effort to ameliorate problems
spawned by the burgeoning industrial revolution.27 Among
these problems were the cost to society of the increasing
number of common law tort actions brought against employers
by injured employees and the uncertainty of the worker's rem-
edy.28 Given the ever increasing number of work-related inju-
ries occurring as Washington became industrialized, the courts
were unable to efficiently provide civil tort remedies for
injured workers. Moreover, when judgments were given, the
tortfeasor-employers merely attempted to pass on the cost of
the judgment to consumers. The point of workers' compensa-
tion was not only to quickly and surely compensate injured
workers, but to do so as economically as possible. Through
industrial insurance, the cost could be spread among the
employees and employers, with high-risk industries paying
more for coverage than low-risk industries, thereby minimizing
the externalization of the cost of work-related injuries. When
the Industrial Insurance Act was passed in 1911, occupational
26. Comment, What is Wrong with Maine's Occupational Disease Law, 34 ME. L
REV. 165 (1982) [hereinafter Disease Law] (discussing general development of
occupational disease law in the United States).
27. 1911 WASH. LAws, ch. 74, § 5. See infra note 28.
28. The legislature's declaration of the purpose of the workers' compensation act
reads as follows:
The common law [tort] system governing the remedy of workmen against
employers for injuries received in hazardous work is inconsistent with modern
industrial conditions. In practice it proves to be economically unwise and
unfair. Its administration has produced the result that little of the cost of the
employer has reached the worker and that little only at large expense to the
public. The remedy of the workman has been uncertain, slow and inadequate.
Injuries in such works, formerly occasional, have become frequent and
inevitable. The welfare of the State depends upon its industries, and even
more upon the welfare of its wage-worker. The State of Washington,
therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all
phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and
certain relief for workers, injured in their extra hazardous work, and their
families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault
and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation,
except as otherwise provided in this act; and to that end all civil actions and
civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the
courts of the State over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this act
provided.
1911 WASH. LAws, ch. 74, § 1.
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diseases were not covered;' disability compensation was only
provided for workers with disabilities caused by "an injury
resulting from some fortuitous event as distinguished from the
contraction of disease."'  Under the law at that time, a worker
who became disabled after being poisoned by toxic fumes was
deemed to have suffered a compensable injury.A However, a
different worker who was exposed to similar toxic fumes and
thus weakened to the extent that he contracted tuberculosis
(which resulted in a disability) was held not to have suffered a
compensable injury.3 2 This definition of "injury" prevailed
until 1927, when the legislature passed the prototype of the
current injury statute, which defines "injury" as "a sudden and
tangible happening of a traumatic nature, producing an imme-
diate or prompt result....
By the late 1920s it was common knowledge that certain
diseases are peculiar to a given occupation and are brought
about by exposure to certain harmful conditions that are con-
stantly present, and to which all workmen in the occupation
are continually exposed.' However, the 1927 amendment to
the Industrial Insurance Act failed to extend coverage to occu-
pational diseases. 35  In order to have any hope of recovery,
workers disabled by such diseases were forced to bring per-
29. The 1911 Industrial Insurance Act provided:
Each workman who shall be injured whether upon the premises or at the
plant or, he being in the course of his employment, away from the plant of his
employer, or his family or dependents in case of death of the workman, shall
receive out of the accident fund compensation .. .and, except as in this act
otherwise provided, such payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of
action whatsoever against any person whomsoever.
1911 WASH. LAWS, ch. 74, § 5.
30. 1911 WASH. LAWS, ch. 74, § 3.
31. Seattle Can Co. v. Department of Labor and Indus., 147 Wash. 303, 265 P. 739
(1928) (court allowed claims of workers poisoned by Benzol fumes, even though the
workers did not suddenly fall ill upon first exposure, but only after repeated
exposure).
32. Depre v. Pacific Coast Forge Co., 145 Wash. 263, 259 P. 720 (1927) (court
disallowed claim because worker who was exposed to sulfuric and muriatic fumes for
several months and consequently weakened to the point of being susceptible to the
contraction of tuberculosis (which he did contract) had not been the victim of an
unexpected or sudden happening).
33. 1927 WASH. LAWS, ch. 310, § 2. The reader should note that the word "injury"
stands for both the cause and effect of a work-related disability. See supra note 4.
34. Seattle Can Co., 147 Wash. 303, 265 P. 739 (1928). See also Polson Logging Co.
v. Kelly, 195 Wash. 167, 171, 80 P.2d 412, 414 (1938) (employer not liable for workers'
compensation premiums because, under the statute in force at that time, his industry
had no diseases peculiar to it).
35. 1927 WASH. LAWS, ch. 310, § 4 (compensation is allowed only to the workman
who is injured in the course of his employment).
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sonal injury suits against their employers. Consequently, the
Washington courts had yet another tort crisis to deal with.36
At this time, the courts allowed recovery solely to workers
whose diseases were "peculiar to their occupations. '37  This
requirement prevented the extension of liability to the employ-
ers for the everyday ailments and communicable diseases con-
tracted by their workers.' Faced with an ever-increasing
number of such suits, in 1937 the legislature extended workers'
compensation coverage to include occupational disease.39 This
gave employers immunity from actions filed by disabled work-
ers who were pleading common law negligence. 4°
In that first occupational disease statute,4' the legislature
provided for "compensation for disability or death caused by
any one of a list of 21 specified diseases if acquired in certain
employments specified for each disease."'2 For example, the
legislature specified that anthrax was considered an occupa-
tional disease (only if contracting it resulted in disability) of
handlers of wools, hair, hides, bristles, or skins.43 That first
occupational disease statute did not stand unchanged for long.
The realities of the workplace, where a multitude of disability-
causing occupational diseases could be contracted under an
endless variety of working conditions, soon made it apparent
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. Department of Labor and Indus. v. Kinville, 35 Wash. App. 80, 84-85, 664 P.2d
1311, 1313-14 (1983). See infra note 92.
38. The "peculiar to the occupation" requirement results in the worker having a
higher burden of proof than mere causation. This prevents liability for everyday
ailments. See Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 482-83, 745 P.2d at 1303. Although a worker
might not contract a disease "but for" his work, unless the disease is only contracted
by workers in the same occupation, the disease would not give rise to a valid claim for
benefits. This burden would bar claims for everyday communicable ailments like the
flu, as well it should. However, the higher burden established by the "peculiar to the
occupation" language is too great since it will also bar other claims that should be
allowed. If, for example, dental assistants and thermometer assemblers could both
contract mercury poisoning, it could not be said that mercury poisoning is "peculiar to"
either occupation. Thus, under the rigid logic of the "peculiar to the occupation"
standard, claims for mercury poisoning would not be allowed, even though mercury
poisoning is not an everyday disease and is solely related to working conditions.
39. 1937 WASH. LAws, ch. 212, § 1.
40. The immunity given to employers under the original act in 1911 covered
immunity from liability for compensable injuries only. See supra notes 28-30. When
the act was extended to cover occupational disease, employer immunity was extended
to cover immunity from liability for compensable occupational diseases as well. 1937
WASH. LAws, ch. 212, § 1.
41. See supra note 39.
42. Workmen's Compensation, supra note 25, at 154.
43. See supra note 39.
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that the list of compensable occupational diseases was inade-
quate. In response, the legislature followed the lead of other
state legislatures" and in 1941 exchanged the finite enumer-
ated scheme for a general definition of "occupational dis-
ease."45  When drafting the new statute, the legislature
expressly considered and rejected the "peculiar to the occupa-
tion" language that had been used by Washington courts prior
to the passage of the first occupational disease statute.'
Instead, the legislature identified occupational disease as "such
disease or infection as arises naturally and proximately out of
extra-hazardous employment."4  The definition of "occupa-
tional disease" remains essentially the same today.48
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF INDUSTRIAL
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE LAW IN WASHINGTON STATE
When processing timely claims for disability benefits, the
Department of Labor and Industries first determines whether
a particular disability is the result of an injury and if not, then
it determines whether the disability is the result of an occupa-
tional disease.49
A. Injury
An injury will not be covered unless it can be character-
ized as evidencing the following five elements (inherent in the
injury statute):' "(1) an event at a particular point in time,
(2) a traumatic event, (3) an event which produces something
immediately or within a brief period of time, (4) something
occurring from outside the body, and (5) the presence of a
physical condition resulting from that event."' 51 This matter-
of-fact interpretation of the injury statute effectively limits
44. For an excellent history of the development of workers' compensation law
throughout the world, as well as a thorough outline of the evolution of occupational
disease coverage in the United States, see Disease Law, supra note 26. See also Larson,
The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 Cornell L.Q. 206 (1952).
45. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
46. Dennis v. Department of Labor and Indus., 44 Wash. App. 423, 429, 722 P.2d
1317, 1320-21 (1986).
47. 1941 WASH. LAWS, ch. 235, § 1. The "extra-hazardous" criterion was later
dropped when the legislature extended workers' compensation coverage to most forms
of employment in the state. 1959 WASH. LAws ch. 308, § 4.
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987). For text of statute, see supra note 5.
49. MANUAL, supra note 18, at B-14.
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (1987). For text of the statute, see supra note 4.
51. MANUAL, supra note 18, at B-14.
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injury coverage to accidental injuries, such as the situation
when the proverbial tree falls on a worker's head.52 The
harshness of this narrow coverage is lessened to the degree
that the administrators of the workers' compensation system
recognize the common law tort principle that "an employer
takes an employee as he finds him.""' . Thus, if a work-related
injury aggravates or "lights up" a preexisting condition, the
disabled worker still will be entitled to full benefits.m In an
injury aggravation case, it makes no difference whether the
underlying condition is or is not work-related."
B. Occupational Disease
If a disability is not an injury or the result of one, the
Department of Labor and Industries will determine whether
the disability can be categorized as an occupational disease or
52. Also included in this category are claims for a disability that immediately
manifests itself after a worker receives a finite series of traumas, such as jolts and jars,
provided that the traumas occurred over a short, well-defined period of time. Lehtinen
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 63 Wash. 2d 456, 458-59, 387 P.2d 760, 762 (1963).
53. MANUAL, supra note 18, at B-15. See also W. PROSSER & M. KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 43 at 291-92 (5th ed. 1984). At common law, a
tortfeasor took a victim as he found him. Thus, if the tortfeasor killed a soft-headed
man with a blow to the head that would have merely stunned the average man, the
tortfeasor was still liable for the death of the thin-skulled victim. See also Wendt v.
Department of Labor and Indus., 18 Wash. App. 674, 571 P.2d 229 (1977).
54. The term "lights up" means to render a latent condition symptomatic. Harbor
Plywood Corp. v. Department of Labor and Indus., 48 Wash. 2d 553, 556-57, 295 P.2d
310, 313 (1956). See generally Bennett v. Department of Labor and Indus., 95 Wash. 2d
531, 627 P.2d 104 (1981) (back injury aggravated latent and preexisting spinal
condition); McDougle v. Department of Labor and Indus., 64 Wash. 2d 640, 393 P.2d 631
(1964) (back injury aggravated latent and preexisting osteoarthritic condition); Miller
v. Department of Labor and Indus., 200 Wash. 674, 94 P.2d 764 (1939) (back injury
aggravated latent and preexisting congenital defect).
55. Harbor Plywood Corp. v. Department of Labor and Indus., 48 Wash. 2d 553,
295 P.2d 310 (1956). As long as there is no disability prior to the injury, the worker
will receive benefits for the full extent of the disability he had subsequent to the
injury. If there is disability prior to the injury, then any permanent disability award
(as opposed to time loss benefits) will be reduced pro rata according to the percentage
of the post-injury disability that is attributable to the pre-injury disability. Bennett, at
534, 627 P.2d at 106. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical: A, B, and C are
loggers. A is in perfect physical condition. B and C have bad backs. B has had back
surgery for work-related injuries, and though his back is weaker than A's, B's
condition is stable and not disabling and he is receiving no medical treatment. C is
predisposed to osteoarthritis and has a degenerative spinal condition which is not
work-related and that condition is not disabling. A, B, and C are each struck by a
falling tree and receive blows to the back. Consequently, each is disabled. The blows
received by B and C would not have disabled A. Under Washington's workers'
compensation system, A, B, and C would receive full permanent disability awards.
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as the result of one.5 In contrast to the standard injury
inquiry, the Department of Labor and Industries (prior to the
supreme court's decision in Dennis) went outside the language
of the occupational disease statute when adjudicating an occu-
pational disease claim.57 In order for a disabled worker to be
compensated, the etiology of the worker's disabling condition
must have been such as to have satisfied two requisite tests of
the Department of Labor and Industries.ss The first test
required that an occupational disease be proximately caused by
objective circumstances present in the workplace that were
measurable and observable.59 The other test required that an
occupational disease be connected with a particular occupation;
if the disability was common to workers in that particular
occupation but not in others, the disability was considered an
occupational disease.' This latter test is but a milder version
56. MANuAL, supra note 18, at B-14.
57. The Department of Labor and Industries used the Kinville test. Department
of Labor and Indus. v. Kinville, 35 Wash. App. 80, 664 P.2d 1311 (1983). See infra notes
85-161 and accompanying text.
58. MANUAL, supra note 18, at B-16-17.
59. Id. at B-17. This would obviously disqualify stress-induced disability, as the
factors causing stress would not be measurable and observable. However, most stress
cases involve heart attacks and heart cases are analyzed differently than regular injury
or occupational disease cases. For a good explanation of this analysis as it is currently
used when adjudicating heart claims, see Louderback v. Department of Labor and
Indus., 14 Wash. App. 931, 547 P.2d 889 (1976). See also infra note 102. For the
purpose of this Note, the analysis used in the heart cases will not be discussed further.
60. MANUAL, supra note 18, at B-17. The focal point for the tests seems to be the
likelihood that a worker in a certain industry will contract a certain disease. Thus, if it
could be expected that a certain percentage of workers would contract a certain
disease, the disabled worker contracting that disease while working in the industry
associated with that disease would receive benefits. For an example of a situation not
meeting this test because of the "peculiar to the occupation" standard, see Letter from
Nancy Hopper, Department of Labor & Indust. Claims Adjudicator (August 20, 1987)
(rejecting a worker's claim for benefits). In this real-life case, the worker developed a
disabling foot condition as a result of standing stationary for hours each day on a
cement floor at a checkout counter. The worker's name has been deleted to protect
the worker's identity:
Dear Injured Worker:
. . . It is the Department's determination after consideration of all
available information that your condition does not qualify as an industrial
injury nor does it meet the criteria to be accepted as an occupational disease.
To be considered allowable as an industrial injury, you must be able to
document a traumatic incident at a specific time and place in the course of
employment. As your condition developed over a period of time, it does not
meet this criteria.
To be considered as an occupational disease, your condition must meet a
number of criterion: your condition must "arise naturally and proximately
out of employment;" your work duties do not demonstrate that your condition
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of the "peculiar to the occupation" standard that was rejected
by the legislature when it passed the current occupational dis-
ease statute.6
There are several reasons why identifying an occupational
disease is more difficult than identifying an injury. The initial
identification problem lies in the elusive concept of disease
itself. Despite the fact that an occupational disease might best
be described as anything other than an injury that causes a
work-related disability, many people link the concept of dis-
ease with contagion.62 This false assumption can lead to work-
ers with work-related disabilities being denied workers'
compensation benefits merely because a claims administrator
misunderstands a complicated etiology.63
Further compounding the problem of identifying a com-
pensable occupational disease is the legislature's confusing tri-
partite application of the word "disease" in Washington's
workers' compensation law. First, an occupational disease is
would not have developed if you had not been employed as a grocery
checker....
Finally, it has not been demonstrated that workers in your profession are
more likely than the general public to develop neuritis of the foot and/or
tarsal tunnel syndrome. Your condition is not a hazard which is specific to
your occupation.
I regret that we are unable to offer a more favorable response to your
request for reconsideration. An Order will be issued and mailed separately
which affirms the rejection of your claim....
61. The standard is almost the same, for the worker must prove that his disease is
inherent in his occupation, but not in others. In the "peculiar to the occupation"
context, the worker must show that workers in other occupations do not get his
disease. The former requires a showing of greater likelihood of contraction in a
particular employment; the latter requires a showing of no likelihood of contraction in
other employment.
62. See generally Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease,
43 MONT. L. REv. 75, 92-100 (1982) (preconceived notions of disease based on five false
assumptions).
63. Id. at 93. Among the false assumptions concerning disease are the following:.
(1) that a disease is caused by repeated or gradual exposure; (2) that a disease is
manifested over a period of time; (3) that a disease is caused by a chemical, bacterial,
or viral agent, as opposed to a physical agent such as a heavy weight or a sharp object;
(4) that a disease is expected, but an injury is unexpected; and (5) that proof of work-
relatedness is different for a disease than it is for an injury. The problems with these
assumptions should be apparent. First, a one-time exposure to a highly toxic substance
can sometimes cause disability at a much later date. Second, after gradual and
repeated exposure to a toxic substance, one might suddenly have an allergic reaction.
Third, long-term exposure to friction or vibration can cause disability. Fourth, as
science and technology advance, it can be assumed that people will be exposed to new
substances that will cause unexpected diseases, just as with increased medical
knowledge it likely will be discovered that exposures that were once thought to be safe
have caused diseases that were once thought to be unrelated to exposures.
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the interaction between the worker's body and the work condi-
tions that causes disability.' Second, the resulting disabling
condition is also known as an occupational disease.' Third, in
an aggravation case, the underlying condition also might be an
occupational disease.' Hence, in a common occupational dis-
ease claim, a Department of Labor and Industries claims
administrator might be confronted with a worker whose occu-
pational disease was aggravated by an occupational disease,
which would result in another occupational disease.67 Because
of the prevailing false assumptions about disease and the ambi-
guity of the occupational disease statute, occupational disease
claims seem much harder to establish than injury claims.6
In most states, a work-related disability is considered an
injury or an occupational disease; in those states, the defini-
tions of "injury" and "occupational disease" overlap enough so
that no work-related disability falls between the two defini-
tions.69 Thus, the focus in those states is on whether the disa-
bility is work-related-if it is, then the disability is a
compensable disability. Until very recently, in Washington,
there was a gap between the definitions of "injury" and "occu-
pational disease." Disabilities caused by repetitive trauma and
occupational disease aggravations of nonoccupational diseases
or conditions fell into this gap and consequently were not
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.180 (1987): "Every worker who suffers diability from
an occupational disease in the course of employment .... "
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987). For text of the statute, see supra note 5.
66. Id. Such a condition would be an occupational disease if it was the residual of
an old occupational disease, whether the residual condition is disabling or not. For
example, a worker might have asbestosis, an occupational disease, then be exposed to
isocyanate fumes causing further respiratory damage constituting an occupational
disease.
67. See supra note 66. In the hypothetical given in the preceding note, the
asbestosis would constitute a preexisting occupational disease. The inhalation of
isocyanates over an indefinite period of time would be an occupational disease.
Finally, the resulting condition would be an occupational disease.
68. In 1985, out of a total of 192,503 workers' compensation claims that were
accepted by the Department of Labor and Industries, only 8,750 were occupational
disease claims. Department of Labor and Indus., WASHINGTON STATE WORK INJURY
AND ILLNESS SUMMARY 3, 6 (1985). Admittedly, it is not known by this author whether
this statistic shows that there were far fewer occupational disease claims made, or
simply that there were fewer allowed. The three most frequently reported
occupational diseases were (1) inflammation of the joints, 2,077 cases; (2) systemic
poisoning, 1,449 cases; and (3) dermatitis, 1,139 cases. Id. at 6.
69. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. For a brief exegesis of the various
burdens of proof and the difficulty of evidence-gathering that a worker faces in an
occupational disease case, see Note, Dual Causation of Occupational Disease: Rutledge





Repetitive trauma, trauma that occurs over an indefinite
or extended period of time, did not fit within the injury stat-
ute,71 nor, prior to Dennis, was it considered an occupational
disease. 72 Because repetitive trauma, by definition, takes place
over an extended period of time, it did not meet the finite time
frame required by the injury statute.73 Thus, courts held that
repetitive trauma was not the type of accidental trauma that
the legislature had in mind when it drafted the injury statute.
This follows because repetitive trauma over an indefinite
period of time can neither be "sudden" nor bring about a
"prompt result" as required by statute.7 4 Until Dennis, repeti-
tive trauma did not give rise to a compensable occupational dis-
ease claim.75
Repetitive trauma almost invariably encompasses a wear
and tear phenomenon acting on some bodily part. Wear and
tear is most commonly caused by physical movement, which is
present to a certain degree in everyday life. Movement is not
"peculiar" to any particular occupation; thus, only in rare
instances could the etiology of a repetitive trauma-induced con-
dition meet the "peculiar to the occupation" test used by the
Washington courts.76 Moreover, the conditions caused by wear
and tear, for example, abrasions, joint problems, respiratory
ailments, etc., are not peculiar to any particular occupation, so
coverage for them as occupational diseases also would not be
forthcoming because of their failure to meet the "peculiar to
the occupation" test used by the Department of Labor and
70. Snyder v. Department of Labor and Indus., 40 Wash. App. 566, 699 P.2d 256
(1985). Only recently was coverage allowed for occupational disease aggravations of
preexisting occupational disease conditions. However, aggravations of non-
occupational disease conditions were still not considered compensable.
71. Ga7rett Freightlines, 45 Wash. App. at 343-45, 725 P.2d at 468-69.
72. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 483, 745 P.2d at 1304.
73. Garrett Freightlines, 45 Wash. App. at 343-45, 725 P.2d at 468-69. See also
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (1987). For a digest of cases wherein other jurisdictions
issued conflicting rules as to coverage of repetitive trauma-based disabilities, see
LARSON, supra note 6, at § § 39.10-39.60. For a digest of cases wherein other
jurisdictions issued conflicting rules as to coverage of occupational disease aggravations
of preexisting conditions, see LARSON, supro note 6, at § 41.63.
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (1987). For the text of the statute, see supra note
4.
75. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 483, 745 P.2d at 1304.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 85-161.
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Industries and the Washington courts.77 Finally, as described
below, the Department of Labor and Industries did not use its
standard occupational disease analysis when scrutinizing repet-
itive trauma-based claims.
Although recognizing that repetitive trauma falls "into a
grey area between 'trauma' [meaning 'injury'] and 'occupa-
tional disease'," the Department of Labor and Industries used
neither injury nor occupational disease analysis when adjudi-
cating repetitive trauma-based claims." For repetitive trauma
claims, the Department of Labor and Industries developed
independent criteria, which required that a worker's disability
be the result of unusually strenuous repetitive movements
made by that worker that were not part of the routine of that
worker.79 These criteria adopted by the Department of Labor
and Industries were without statutory or common law founda-
tion. Apparently, the Department of Labor and Industries was
using these criteria in order to avoid paying benefits to victims
of everyday wear and tear.8°
77. This situation is best explained using a hypothetical. Sally is a disabled
worker. For several years she worked as a heavy equipment operator. Sally's job
required her to pull a lever with her right arm several hundred times each working
day. Sally now has a severe bursitis condition that impairs the use of her right
shoulder and elbow. Her doctor has told her that her condition is the direct result of
pulling that lever for so many years. Until Dennis, the policy of the Department of
Labor and Industries was to reject claims like Sally's.
This policy was curious because this type of trauma was expressly recognized as an
occupational disease in the 1937 statute that enumerated occupational diseases. 1937
WASH. LAwS, ch. 212, § 1. The reader must bear in mind that most claims for workers'
compensation benefits, be they accepted or rejected, begin and end at the level of the
Department of Labor and Industries. The Department of Labor and Industries looks
to court rulings for guidance in its own adjudication of claims. These court rulings
that-for whatever problems of proof or policy-bar benefits from those suffering
from repetitive trauma-based disabilities or occupational disease aggravations of
preexisting nonoccupational conditions can have tremendous repercussions for the
silent majority that is willing to take the Department of Labor and Industries' "no" for
an answer.
78. MANUAL, supra note 18, at B-18-19.
79. Id.
80. In Sally's case, since she pulled the lever every day, her doing so would be
considered a routine part of her job, no matter how strenuous pulling the lever was.
Because pulling the lever was not "unusual," Sally would not be eligible for disability
benefits. This would be true even though she would not have become disabled had she
not pulled the lever and even though, under one of the occupational disease tests, the
pulling of the lever is an objective circumstance that is measurable and observable.
See supra text accompanying note 59. Under the second test, Sally's disability would
not give rise to a valid claim because bursitis is not peculiar to heavy equipment
operators. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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2. Occupational Disease Aggravations of Preexisting,
Nonoccupational Diseases or Conditions
Occupational disease aggravations of preexisting, nonoccu-
pational diseases or conditions also were not covered under the
workers' compensation system prior to the Dennis ruling. The
probable reason for this is that the Department of Labor and
Industries followed the "peculiar to the occupation" standard
and denied coverage of ordinary diseases of life. Thus, accord-
ing to the Department of Labor and Industries' logic, if the
occupational disease must be inherent in the occupation, it fol-
lows that the preexisting condition being aggravated should
also be inherent to some occupation, and not be an ordinary
disease of life. The Department's position was not consistent
with the fact that injury aggravations of preexisting, nonoccu-
pational diseases or conditions were covered."' For example, a
worker who suffers a blow to the back (an injury) that aggra-
vates a previously quiescent, congenital spinal deformity will
receive benefits if the blow results in disability.' Likewise, a
worker who inhales irritants over several years (an occupa-
tional disease) and consequently aggravates a previously quies-
cent condition of work-related emphysema (an occupational
disease) will be compensated if disability ensues.' However,
theoretically, until Dennis, a worker who inhaled irritants
over several years (an occupational disease) and consequently
aggravated a previously latent congenital respiratory condition,
thereby becoming disabled, was denied benefits."
IV. THE JuDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
LAW IN WASHINGTON STATEs5
The Washington courts have had little to say about the
state's injury statute. The courts considered the statute "crab-
bed and probably inconsistent with the professed goal" of the
workers' compensation act, yet "nonetheless clear and rela-
tively unambiguous. ' s
81. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 475-76, 745 P.2d at 1300.
82. See supra note 54.
83. Snyder, 40 Wash. App. at 575, 699 P.2d at 259.
84. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 483, 745 P.2d at 1300.
85. This Note considers decisions only in Division I and Division II of the
Washington State Court of Appeals. There were no decisions in Division III that
addressed the issues relevant to this article.
86. Garrett Freightlines, 45 Wash. App. at 345, 725 P.2d at 469.
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Until Dennis, 7 the courts had even less to say about
Washington's occupational disease statute." The highest state
court to address the occupational disease statute in any detail
had been the Washington Court of Appeals, Division II.9 In
Division II, the court imposed a strict standard akin to the old
"peculiar to the occupation" language.' The Division II stan-
dard was the only clear authority for the Department of Labor
and Industries to follow when processing claims for occupa-
tional disease-based disabilities.
In fashioning its standard, the Division II court inexplica-
bly relied on Washington Supreme Court decisions that pre-
dated the current occupational disease statute.91  When
deciding the case of Department of Labor and Industries v.
Kinville, the court of appeals stated that the statutory lan-
guage requiring that a disease arise "naturally and proxi-
mately" out of employment meant that only those diseases
that are inherent in a disabled worker's particular occupation
would be compensable.92 The court further ruled that a
"worker has the burden of establishing that the conditions pro-
ducing his disease are peculiar to, or inherent in, his particular
occupation."93 Moreover, the court asserted that to meet this
burden, the worker must show that "the job requirements of
his particular occupation exposed him to a greater risk of con-
tracting the disease than would other types of employment or
nonemployment life."'
Clearly, the Kinville court espoused two very different
standards: the first standard required that to be compensable,
an occupational disease must be associated with a particular
occupation, and the second standard allowed a claim only if the
conditions that caused the disease were unique to a given occu-
pation. One standard focused on the disease, the other on the
conditions causing the disease. Under the former standard, a
worker had to show that his disease was readily identifiable
with his line of work. This burden constrained claimants as
much as the old enumerated statute did, for, while many dis-
87. Dennis, 44 Wash. App. at 435, 722 P.2d at 1324.
88. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987).
89. Kinville, 35 Wash. App. at 84-85, 664 P.2d at 1313-14.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Seattle Can Co. v. Department of Labor and Indus., 147 Wash. 303,
265 P.2d 739 (1928)).
92. Kinville, 35 Wash. App. at 87, 664 P.2d at 1314-15.
93. Id. at 87-88, 664 P.2d at 1314-15.
94. Id. at 88, 664 P.2d at 1315.
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eases can presumably be contracted through employment, only
unusual diseases such as black lung and asbestosis are readily
identified with specific occupations."5 Under the latter stan-
dard, a worker had to show that his occupation required him to
encounter hazards not commonly present in other occupations.
Given the complexity of today's workplace, as well as the myr-
iad of substances and conditions that workers are exposed to,
this also was too great a burden.
Not only did the Kinville court generate faulty analysis,
but it also misconstrued legislative history and misinterpreted
supreme court authority. In resurrecting the "peculiar to the
occupation" standard, the court admitted that it lifted the stan-
dard from a line of cases decided, not on the basis of the "natu-
rally and proximately" terminology of the current statute,'
but upon judicial constructions predating the statute.9 In
doing so, the court ignored the legislature's decision not to use
the "peculiar to the occupation" standard in defining "occupa-
tional disease.""8  Besides ignoring legislative history, the
Kinville court disregarded higher case authority that should
have, through stare decisis, preempted the lower court's hold-
ing. In Simpson v. Department of Labor and Industries," the
supreme court stated that the legislature knew what it was
95. See aupia notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Under the original occupational
disease statute, only certain diseases were covered in a given occupation. 1937 WASH.
LAws, ch. 212, § 1.
96. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987).
97. The Kinville court stated:
In evaluating this issue we have looked to prior Washington decisions which
have addressed the question of whether a particular disease satisfies the
statutory requirements presently contained in (WASH. REV. CODE] § 51.08.140
... . Several early decisions held that in order to satisfy the statutory
requirements a disease had to be peculiar to a given occupation. . . .
Importantly, the 'peculiar to the occupation' requirement espoused in these
decisions was not based on a judicial construction of the 'naturally and
proximately' terminology contained in the then existing occupational disease
statute. Instead, it was based exclusively on a line of cases decided before
enactment of the original occupational disease act in this state.
Kinville, 35 Wash. App. at 84-85, 664 P.2d at 1313 (citing Seattle Can Co. v. Department
of Labor and Indus., 147 Wash. 303, 265 P.2d 739 (1928); St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber
Co. v. Department of Labor and Indus., 19 Wash. 2d 639, 144 P.2d 250 (1943)).
98. Dennis, 44 Wash. App. at 431, 722 P.2d at 1322.
99. 32 Wash. 2d 472, 202 P.2d 448 (1949). The Simpson court opined that the
"peculiar to the occupation" concept was of no relevance to the current occupational
disease statute, as that language had been intentionally omitted from the statute. Id.
at 466-78, 202 P.2d at 451. Additionally, the Simpson court stated that the proximate
cause language was the key to the statute, as the legislature had to be presumed to be
familiar with that term since it used it so prominently in the statute. Id. at 479, 202
P.2d at 452.
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doing when it put the words "naturally and proximately" in
the occupational disease statute, and that the legislature, when
speaking in terms of proximate cause, left no room for the
courts to continue to apply the "peculiar to the occupation"
standard. The supreme court regarded the appropriate inquiry
to be one focusing on work-relatedness, not on the type of
disease:
Under the present act, no disease can be held not to be an
occupational disease as a matter of law, where it has been
proved that the conditions of the extrahazardous employ-
ment in which the claimant was employed naturally and
proximately produced the disease, and that but for the expo-
sure to such conditions the disease would not have been
contracted.1°0
Despite the clarity of the Simpson decision, the Kinville
court managed to avoid the high court's rejection of the "pecu-
liar to the occupation" standard by postulating that Simpson
was overruled, sub silentio, ° by a later supreme court case.1 "2
Only in this way could the Division II court relegate the para-
mount factor of causation to a position inferior to that of the
common law "peculiar to the occupation" standard that had
never been part of Washington's Industrial Insurance Act. The
Division II court's analysis was eventually challenged by the
Division I court in Dennis v. Department of Labor and
100. Id. at 479, 202 P.2d at 452.
101. Kinville, 35 Wash. App. at 86, 664 P.2d at 1314.
102. Favor v. Department of Labor and Indus., 53 Wash. 2d 698, 336 P.2d 382
(1959).' In Favor, the claimant had suffered a coronary occlusion as a result of
allegedly worrying too much about his job. As Favor is a heart case and heart cases
involve different standards, the Kinville court should not have relied on Favor. See
Windust v. Department of Labor and Indus., 52 Wash. 2d 33, 323 P.2d 241 (1958). See
also MANUAL, supra note 18, at B-23-27. See also supra note 59. Holding that the
claimant's condition did not arise "naturally and proximately" out of his employment,
the Favor court opined that "[plersons in all employments, and in all activities are
exposed to the emotional stress and strain of anxiety and worry, and it [the claimant's
occlusion] cannot be said to have arisen naturally and proximately from the claimant's
employment." Favor, 53 Wash. 2d at 706, 336 P.2d at 386-87. On its face, the high
court's ruling in Favor is that the claimant failed to prove causation. The
extrapolation by the Kinville court from the Favor dicta to a "peculiar to the
occupation" standard seems strained, even after considering that Favor is a heart case.
Arguably, what the Favor court was saying was that people get heart attacks all the
time, and there needs to be more evidence of work-relatedness before a claim such as
this one will be allowed. That interpretation is much more reasonable than one
attributing to the Favor court the notion that a heart attack will give rise to a claim if
heart attacks are peculiar to a certain occupation and the worker that had the attack




A. The Facts of the Dennis Case"°4
Kenneth Dennis was a 56-year-old man whose job required
him to use heavy tin snips to cut sheet metal. After 38 years of
using the tin snips for four to five hours per day, Mr. Dennis
developed a disabling wrist condition. This condition was the
result of a latent and preexisting osteoarthritic condition that
was aggravated or "lighted up" by his repetitive use of the tin
snips.1°5 Mr. Dennis' claim for disability benefits was rejected
by the Department of Labor and Industries on the grounds
that (1) he had not suffered an injury and (2) his condition was
not an occupational disease as defined under the statute. Mr.
Dennis' claim presented the questions of whether repetitive
trauma was a compensable occupational disease and whether
an occupational disease aggravation of a latent, nonoccupa-
tional condition was compensable under the occupational dis-
ease statute.
Mr. Dennis appealed the Department of Labor and Indus-
tries' rejection of his claim." e At a hearing held before an
industrial appeals judge, Mr. Dennis' attending physician testi-
fied that Mr. Dennis' disability was caused by his work.107 The
doctor admitted that Mr. Dennis had osteoarthritis in various
parts of his body, but concluded that since only the osteoarthri-
103. Dennis, 44 Wash. App. at 431, 722 P.2d at 1322.
104. Id. at 424-26, 722 P.2d at 1318-19. All of the facts that follow in this section
are taken from the opinion of the court of appeals.
105. "Osteoarthritis" is defined as "noninflammatory degenerative joint disease."
W. DORLAND, DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDIcAL DICTIONARY 1068 (26th ed. 1985).
106. Such appeals are taken pursuant to WASH. REv. CODE § 51.52.060 (1987).
Because repetitive traumas and occupational disease aggravation of preexisting
nonoccupational conditions were two disabilities that the Department of Labor and
Industries had (up until now) refused to recognize, the fact that Mr. Dennis' claim
involved both of these disabilities made his the ideal case for supreme court review.
107. An appeal from a "final" order of the Department of Labor and Industries
may be taken to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals by an aggrieved party
within 60 days of the issuance of the order. Id. § 51.52.060. The appeal, if granted, is
then heard at an administrative appeals hearing. An industrial appeals judge is an
administrative judge who presides at appeals hearings. A proposed decision and order
is drafted by the industrial appeals judge at the close of the hearing. Any party
wishing to dispute the proposed decision and order has 20 days following issuance of
the order to file a petition for review before the joint, three-person Board of Industrial
Insurance Appeals. Id. § 51.52.104. If the petition is denied or if the joint Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals reviews the case and issues a final determinative order, a
dissatisfied party may file an appeal within 30 days with the superior court for a trial
de novo. Id. § 51.52.110. Following a trial before the superior court, further appeals
may be taken before higher courts as in any civil matter. Id. § 51.52.140.
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tis in Mr. Dennis' wrists was symptomatic, the nature of Mr.
Dennis' work had caused the disability by aggravating the pre-
viously nonsymptomatic osteoarthritis. At the hearing, Mr.
Dennis based his appeal on the physician's testimony. He did
not attempt to meet the Kinville burden of proving that the
work requirement producing his disease, i.e., the use of the tin
snips, was peculiar to or inherent in his particular occupation
and that this work required him to be exposed to a greater risk
of contracting osteoarthritis than would other types of employ-
ment or unemployment life."°8 After the hearing, the indus-
trial appeals judge issued a proposed decision and order
holding that because Mr. Dennis' preexisting osteoarthritis was
aggravated by his work-related use of the tin snips, he was
entitled to disability benefits.
Upon reviewing the industrial appeals judge's order, the
Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals reversed and ruled that
Mr. Dennis was not entitled to workers' compensation bene-
fits."°  Though the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals
agreed that Mr. Dennis' use of the tin snips aggravated his pre-
existing osteoarthritis, it held that since the preexisting
osteoarthritic condition was unrelated to Mr. Dennis' employ-
ment, any work-related aggravation of the condition was not
compensable as an occupational disease. Thus, the Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals followed the Department of
Labor and Industries' policy of not allowing occupational dis-
ease aggravations of even latent nonoccupational conditions. 110
Mr. Dennis appealed the ruling to the superior court, which
granted the Department of Labor and Industries' motion for
summary judgment."' Mr. Dennis then appealed to the Court
of Appeals, Division I.
B. Ruling of the Court of Appeals, Division I
After concluding its review of the previous proceedings,
the court of appeals reversed the superior court's granting of
108. The attempt to meet the burden would have been a futile effort given that
osteoarthritis is a common condition not limited to the tin snipping trade.
109. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 469, 745 P.2d at 1296-97. See supra note 107
(explaining the Board of Industrial Insurance appeals process). The Board of
Industrial Insurance Appeals is an independent state agency that was created, in part,
to review disputes between injured workers, their employers, and the Department of
Labor and Industries. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.52.010-.020 (1987).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
111. See supro note 107. Such appeals to the superior court level are taken
pursuant to WASH. REv. CODE § 51.52.110 (1987).
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the Department of Labor and Industries' motion for summary
judgment, remanding the case to the superior court for a jury
trial de novo." 2 The court based its reversal on three grounds.
First, contrary to the ruling below, the court stated that repeti-
tive trauma could be considered an occupational disease." 3
Second, despite the then-current policy of the Department of
Labor and Industries, the court concluded that a work-related
aggravation of a latent nonoccupational condition resulting in
disability was compensable. "4 Third, contrary to the Kinville
court, the court of appeals held that a worker does not have to
show that the conditions producing the worker's disability
were peculiar to the worker's particular occupation, but only
that the conditions naturally and proximately caused the
disability." 5
C. The Analysis of the Court of Appeals, Division I
By duly considering the legislative history of the Indus-
trial Insurance Act,11 the past judicial treatment of the occu-
pational disease statute," 7 and the general policy concerns
behind Washington's workers' compensation system," 8 the
intermediate appellate court was able to review a complex case
without repeating the errors of the Department of Labor and
Industries and the Kinville court. Focusing upon the Indus-
trial Insurance Act's underlying purpose of compensating
workers with work-related disabilities, whether such disabili-
ties are the result of injury or disease, the court concluded that
the law requires that "a worker should be compensated if the
worker's occupational activities caused disability .... "9 Not-
ing that the "[]egislature expressly rejected the 'peculiar to
[the occupation]' language in 1941 when framing the current
occupational disease definition," the court disavowed the
Kinville court's use of that standard.120 The appellate court
claimed that the use of that standard caused the Kinville court
to erroneously focus on the relationship between the worker's
112. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.52.115 (1987) (jury trial de novo standard of review).
113. Dennis, 44 Wash. App. at 428, 722 P.2d at 1320.
114. Id. at 435-36, 722 P.2d at 1324.
115. Id.
116. WASH. REv. CODE tit. 51 (1987).
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987).
118. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
119. Dnnis, 44 Wash. App. at 426-27, 722 P.2d at 1319.
120. Id. at 431, 722 P.2d at 1322.
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occupation and the conditions causing the worker's disabil-
ity. 2 ' The Division I court stated that the proper focus for the
inquiry was on the disability and its relation to the worker's
work-related activities. 122 To make this inquiry, the court
ruled that the occupational disease statute must be literally
observed. According to the court, a workers' compensation
claimant bears the burden of proving (on a more probable than
not basis) "whether the disease-based disability was caused by
the work or its conditions to meet the 'proximate' requirement,
and the logical relationship of the disability to the work or its
conditions to meet the 'naturally' requirement.'
2 3
By hinging its analysis on the causation issue, the Division
I court discarded all of the tests that the Department of Labor
and Industries and the Kinville court had created in order to
scrutinize the mechanics of a worker contracting an occupa-
tional disease.' 2 ' As far as the Division I court was concerned,
when the only issue is whether a work-related activity caused
disability, whether that disability was caused by a repetitive
trauma, gradual exposure, or aggravation of a preexisting con-
dition is irrelevant.'2 Moreover, the court's focus made the
issue of whether a preexisting condition was work-related
moot in occupational disease aggravation cases. This has
always been true in cases involving injury aggravations. 26
Although its test for adjudicating an occupational disease
claim rendered the issues of repetitive trauma and aggrava-
tions of nonoccupational conditions irrelevant, the Division I
court nevertheless addressed both of those topics in-depth,
showing where other courts had gone wrong in upholding the
Department of Labor and Industries' policy on those issues.127




124. See supra text accompanying notes 49-84. See also supra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text.
125. For that matter, even the distinction between injury and occupational disease
is irrelevant. However, because the statutory structure requires that injury and
occupational disease be segregated, the time element can serve to define the difference
between the two statutory constructs. Yet, even the time element distinction does not
bear on the issue of causation.
126. As long as the injury is the proximate cause of disability, any nondisabling
preexisting condition is irrelevant when determining disability awards. Fochtman v.
Department of Labor and Indus., 7 Wash. App. 286, 291, 499 P.2d 255, 259 (1972). See
supra note 55 (for segregation of preexisting disability rule).
127. Dennis, 44 Wash. App. at 430-35, 722 P.2d at 1321-24.
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Occupational Disease
occupational disease statute, conclusively showing that the leg-
islature had allowed claims for disabling blisters, abrasions,
and bursitis-like conditions brought about by the processes of
continuous friction, rubbing, pressure, and vibration.' s Since
the legislature had abandoned the painfully narrow enumer-
ated statute for a general definition of occupational disease, the
court reasoned that at the very least, occupational diseases
enumerated under the old statute would be considered occupa-
tional diseases under the new statute.'- 9 The court concluded
that judicial denial of claims for disability caused by repetitive
trauma-that would have been covered under the old statute-
was unsupportable."3 On this point, the court firmly stated
that there is "not the sort of gap in coverage between discrete
injuries and occupational diseases as the Department [of Labor
and Industries] now argues exists in the current statutory
structure.'
131
The court further pointed out the inconsistency in the
Department of Labor and Industries' disparate treatment of
injury aggravations and occupational disease aggravations,
attributing this treatment to the fact that both the Department
of Labor and Industries and the courts wrongly focus on the
nature of the preexisting condition rather than appropriately
focusing on the cause of the disability."3 Citing with approval
a line of New York cases allowing claims for aggravations,'
the court quoted from one New York decision wherein it was
held:
The ultimate test is not the initiation or precipitation of the
disease itself, but whether the employment acts upon that
disease or condition in such a manner as to cause a disability
which did not previously exist.' 3 '
128. Id. at 427-28, 722 P.2d at 1319-20 (citing 1937 WASH. LAwS, ch. 212, § 1).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 428, 722 P.2d at 1320.
132. Id. at 431-32, 722 P.2d at 1322.
133. Id. at 432, 722 P.2d at 1322 (citing Hollander v. Valor Clothers, Inc., 91 A.D.2d
731, 457 N.Y.S.2d 1002-03 (1982)) (compensation denied because preexisting condition
was active prior to employment; "some distinctive feature of the employment must
cause disability by activating the condition"); Perez v. Pearl-Wick Corp., 56 A.D.2d 239,
392 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1977) (granting compensation for disabling rheumatoid arthritis
which had been dormant prior to work); D'Angelo v. Loft Candy Corp., 33 A.D. 1077,
307 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1970) (awakening lumbosacral arthritis linked to nature of work
activities).
134. Dennis, 44 Wash. App. at 433, 722 P.2d at 1323 (quoting Perez, 56 AD.2d at
241, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 498).
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After the Division I court issued its opinion, the Department of
Labor and Industries filed a petition for review with the
supreme court, which granted the petition.
D. The State Supreme Court Opinion in Dennis
In a unanimous opinion, the Washington State Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, Division I opinion in
Dennis.'s5 By so doing, the court ended 46 years of uncertainty
as to the meaning of Washington's occupational disease stat-
ute,1  and extended coverage to repetitive trauma cases and
occupational disease aggravations of preexisting, nonwork-
related conditions. 137 However, on the most crucial point, the
burden of proof for determining whether or not a disability
rises to the level of a compensable occupational disease, the
supreme court rejected the path taken by the Division I
court,"3 and adopted a new test far more workable than any
previously espoused by Washington courts.139
With regard to the repetitive trauma issue, the court cited
the legislature's early adherence to the proposition that "pro-
gressive physical deterioration due to work conditions could in
time constitute a compensable disability.' 14° In finding that
Dennis' disability, brought on by 38 years of repetitive tin snip-
ping, was an occupational disease, the court tacitly brought
repetitive trauma conditions within the scope of the occupa-
tional disease statute.'4 '
On the issue of occupational disease aggravation of a pre-
existing, nonwork-related condition, the supreme court agreed
135. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 468, 745 P.2d at 1296. Eight justices joined in the
opinion, written by Justice Brachtenbach. Justice Dore did not take part in the
disposition of the case.
136. See supra note 25.
137. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 473-81, 745 P.2d at 1299-1303.
138. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
139. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 479-83, 745 P.2d at 1302-04.
140. Id. at 473, 745 P.2d at 1299.
141. Id. at 483, 745 P.2d at 1304. "It is reasonable to infer that the use of tin snips
four to five hours per day over 38 years resulted in such wear and tear phenomena as
to aggravate the osteoarthritis in Dennis' wrists to the point of disability. The evidence
in the record is sufficient to support the inference that Dennis' disabling wrist
condition arose naturally and proximately out of his employment." Clearly, 38 years
of wear and tear cannot meet the "sudden" trauma requirement of the injury statute.
See supra note 4. Moreover, the "naturally and proximately" language used by the
court is directly lifted from the occupational disease statute. See supra note 5. Hence,




with and augmented the lower appellate court's opinion as to
why such an aggravation should constitute a compensable occu-
pational disease."4 The supreme court started with the long-
held proposition that the Industrial Insurance Act "is remedial
in nature and is to be liberally construed in order to achieve its
purpose of providing compensation to all covered employees
injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor of
the worker."' 43 Next, the court noted that benefits for occupa-
tional disease-related disabilities are the same as for injury-
related disabilities.'" The court also noted that a worker
whose disability is caused by an occupational disease acting
upon a preexisting, nonwork-related condition is just as dis-
abled as a worker whose occupational disease is in and of itself
disabling. Consequently, the court reasoned that to not extend
workers' compensation coverage to the aggravation situation
would be contrary to the legislature's directive for liberal con-
struction of the Industrial Insurance Act. 45 Moreover, the
court pointed out that it had long maintained that in injury
cases the worker is to be taken as he is found, regardless of
preexisting infirmities. In support of this proposition, the
court cited cases wherein it had previously held that when an
injury aggravates a quiescent condition, the resulting disability
is deemed attributable to the injury and workers' compensa-
tion benefits must be awarded.14
The court concluded that it would be anomalous to allow
compensation when a sudden injury aggravates a preexisting,
nonwork-related disease, but deny compensation when an
occupational disease aggravates a preexisting, nonwork-related
142. Id. at 470, 745 P.2d at 1297.
143. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.010 (1987)); Sacred Heart Medical Center
v. Carrado, 92 Wash. 2d 631, 635, 600 P.2d 1015 (1979); Lightle v. Department of Labor
and Indus., 68 Wash. 2d 507, 510, 413 P.2d 814 (1966); Wilber v. Department of Labor
and Indus., 61 Wash. 2d 439, 446, 378 P.2d 684 (1963); State ex rel. Crabb v. Olinger, 196
Wash. 308, 311, 82 P.2d 865 (1938); Gaines v. Department of Labor and Indus., 1 Wash.
App. 547, 463 P.2d 269 (1969)).
144. Id. at 471, 745 P.2d at 1298 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.180 (1986)).
145. Dennis, Wash. 2d at 471, 745 P.2d at 1298.
146. Id. at 471-72, 745 P.2d at 1298 (citing Groff v. Department of Labor and Indus.,
65 Wash. 2d 35, 44, 395 P.2d 633 (1964); Harbor Plywood Corp. v. Department of Labor
and Indus., 48 Wash. 2d 553, 295 P.2d 310 (1956); Kallos v. Department of Labor and
Indus., 46 Wash. 2d 26, 30, 278 P.2d 393 (1955); Jackson v. Department of Labor and
Indus., 37 Wash. 2d 444, 448, 224 P.2d 338 (1950); Miller v. Department of Labor and
Indus., 200 Wash. 674, 682-83, 94 P.2d 764 (1939); Ray v. Department of Labor and
Indus., 177 Wash. 687, 33 P.2d 375 (1934)).
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disease.147 To the court, the important factor was whether a
disability stems from employment conditions.' 48  Therefore,
the court held that workers who suffer disability resulting
from occupational disease aggravations of preexisting, non-
work-related conditions are entitled to compensation. 49
The most significant thing that the supreme court did was
to create an entirely new burden of proof for a disabled worker
trying to establish that his disability arose "naturally and prox-
imately" out of his employment." ° Though the court agreed
with previous Washington judicial analysis of the "proxi-
mately" element as being the equivalent of proximate cause,15 1
the court rejected the tests for meeting the "naturally" ele-
ment that had been formulated by the courts of Divisions I and
II.152 Instead, the court construed the "naturally" element in
its ordinary sense to mean "as a natural result or conse-
quence" 53 and tied the term to the "arising out of employ-
ment" language in the occupational disease statute.154
147. Id. at 472, 745 P.2d at 1298.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 474-76, 745 P.2d at 1299-1300. In ruling that occupational disease
aggravations of preexisting, nonwork-related conditions could be compensable under
the occupational disease statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987), the supreme
court refused to accept the argument of the Department of Labor and Industries which
would have limited coverage to aggravations of asymptomatic conditions. Recognizing
that Mr. Dennis' case did not present it with an aggravation of asymptomatic
conditions, the court acknowledged that its position on the symptomatic-asymptomatic
issue was dicta and merely stated that it was inclined to handle the situation of an
aggravation of a preexisting, nonwork-related symptomatic condition through use of
the segregation rules. See supra note 55.
150. Id. at 476-83, 745 P.2d at 1300-04.
151. Id. at 477, 745 P.2d at 1301 (citing Ehman v. Department of Labor and Indus.,
33 Wash. 2d 584, 206 P.2d 787 (1949)); Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Co. v. Department
of Labor and Indus., 26 Wash. 2d 233, 241-42, 173 P.2d 786 (1946)). The court succinctly
stated that the proximate cause element requires that "[t]he causal connection
between a claimant's physical condition and his or her employment must be
established by competent medical testimony which shows that the disease is probably,
as opposed to possibly, caused by the employment."
152. The supreme court adhered to the court of appeals, Division I rationale in
rejecting the court of appeals, Division II ruling that the "naturally" element of WASH.
REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987) requires that the disabled worker prove that his disability
is peculiar to his occupation and was caused by conditions unique to that occupation.
Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 478, 745 P.2d at 1301. See also Dennis, 44 Wash. App. at 431-32,
722 P.2d at 1321-22. With regard to the Division I court's logical relation test, the
supreme court found no basis for the test, and stated that such a test provided "little
guidance" to a worker trying to establish his entitlement to workers' compensation
benefits. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 479, 745 P.2d at 1302.
153. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 480, 745 P.2d at 1302 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
JNTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1507 (1981)).
154. Id. at 481, 745 P.2d at 1303 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987)).
Occupational Diseas
Although it placed the "naturally" element in the context
of the "arising out of employment" language, the supreme
court was careful to disavow any connection between the "nat-
urally" element and the "peculiar to the occupation" position
taken by the Division II court.'5 The court held that to estab-
lish entitlement to benefits, in addition to proximate causation,
a disabled worker must establish that his "occupational disease
came about as a matter of course as a natural consequence or
incident of distinctive conditions" of his particular employ-
ment. 156 To meet this requirement, the worker "must show
that his or her particular work conditions more probably than
not caused his or her disease or disease-based disability than
conditions in everyday life or [in] all employments in gen-
eral."' 5 7 Moreover, the court dismissed the Kinville burden of
proof which required the worker to show an increased risk of
disease-based disability related to his particular occupation.'m
In sum, the court ruled that for a worker to establish the
"naturally" element in the occupational disease statute,159 he
must show that his disabling condition was caused by identifi-
able conditions of his work that are not generally present in
his daily activities outside of his employment.'o It follows that
the "distinctive conditions" must be something less than "pecu-
liar" to the worker's own job. However, the conditions must be
a consequence of the worker's job. Though not conceptually
simple or easy to apply, the "distinctive conditions" test
removes from judicial consideration any focus upon the disease
itself and instead focuses on the cause of the disease. In this
way, occupational disease adjudications will henceforth more
closely approximate injury-based adjudications under the "in
the course of employment" requirement of the injury
statute.161
V. CONCLUSION
Battles about the concept of occupational disease were




158. Id. at 482, 745 P.2d at 1303-04 (citing Sacred Heart Medical Center v. Carrado,
92 Wash. 2d 631, 600 P.2d 1015 (1979)).
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987).
160. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 481, 745 P.2d at 1303.
161. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.100 (1987). See supra text accompanying note 51.
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Act was enacted in 1911.162 The first skirmishes were fought
under the flag of common law.l 6s Later, under the Industrial
Insurance Act, the fighting focused upon enumerated listings
of diseases and whether the listings were under- or over-inclu-
sive. 14 Finally, since 1941,l " the conflict has been over occu-
pational disease,"~ and the meaning of the term "occupational
disease."
In attempting to decipher the occupational disease statute,
the Washington courts consistently disagreed about the mean-
ing of the words "naturally and proximately. '167  Though
agreeing that the word "proximately" referred to the legal
standard of proximate cause, some courts ignored the word
"naturally" and limited themselves to an examination of proxi-
mate cause only.1' Other courts believed that the statute
"must be construed so as to give effect to every word contained
therein," and thus gave the word "naturally" some meaning
beyond that of proximate cause.16 9 These latter courts ruled
that the word "naturally" meant that only conditions of
employment could produce the occupational disease in order
for the disease to be compensable. Because disease was not
compensable unless it was a condition of employment, a disa-
bility that resulted from an occupational disease aggravating or
"lighting up" a preexisting nonoccupational condition was not
compensable. 7 ° The Washington Court of Appeals, Division I,
on the other hand, viewed the words "naturally and proxi-
mately" as requiring that a disability be proximately caused by
work-related conditions and that the conditions and the disa-
162. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.140 (1987).
167. Id. § 51.32.180. See supra text accompanying notes 85-161.
168. Simpson, 32 Wash. 2d at 479, 202 P.2d at 452. The court interpreted the
legislative intent of the occupational disease statute by construing the meaning of
"proximate cause" and disregarding the word "naturally." Division II rejected this
interpretation.
169. Kinville, 35 Wash. App. at 86-87, 664 P.2d at 1314 (citing In re Marriage of
Timmons, 94 Wash. 2d 594, 617 P.2d 1032 (1980)).
170. See BOARD OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE APPEALS, DIGEST OF LEADING
WASHINGTON CASES ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 158 (1972), wherein a Board
of Industrial Insurance Appeals commentator states that the supreme court cases
following Simpson stand for the proposition that "the mere aggravation or acceleration
of a disease process by working conditions does not make it an 'occupational disease'
which 'arises naturally and proximately' out of employment."
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bility be logically related.1 7 ' Finally, the Washington Supreme
Court held that to meet the "naturally and proximately"
requirement, a disabled worker must show that his or her disa-
bility was proximately caused by distinctive work conditions,
as opposed to nonwork conditions.17 2
All of the standards set forth in the preceding paragraph
must be considered in the context of the legislature's goal in
promulgating the Industrial Insurance Act. The goal is to com-
pensate workers for disabilities that they sustain as a direct
result of their work, as opposed to those disabilities caused by
the natural progression of life.17 Arguably, the main thrust of
enumerated lists, repetitive trauma and aggravation excep-
tions, "peculiar to the occupation" standards, "logical relation"
tests, and even the Dennis court's "distinctive conditions"
requirement has been to attempt to eliminate from coverage
those disabilities not directly caused by work, but by everyday
life. It is well established that the Industrial Insurance Act
was not meant to provide workers with a general health and
accident insurance plan. 7 4 As Washington law amply illus-
trates, however, it is possible to ham-fistedly draft these
171. Dennis, 44 Wash. App. at 435, 722 P.2d at 1324. Although all of these courts
have acknowledged the legislature's directive to use the proximate cause test when
adjudicating occupational disease claims, the pertinent case law lacks any indication
that the legal construct of "proximate cause" is used in workers' compensation cases as
it is used in other civil litigation. In Washington, proximate cause is divided into two
distinct parts, cause in fact and legal causation. Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 778-
79, 698 P.2d 77, 83 (1985). The first part, cause in fact, deals with the direct physical
connection existing between the worker's employment and the worker's disability. As
a factual issue, in order for the worker to establish a valid claim, the worker must
prove that "but for" the worker's employment the worker would not have become
disabled. Id. at 778, 698 P.2d at 83. The second part of proximate cause, legal
causation, "involves a determination of whether legal liability should attach (or in the
case of workers' compensation, whether benefits should be given) as a matter of law
considering the existence of cause in fact. Id. at 779, 698 P.2d at 83. Given the facts of
each case, the courts are supposed to mingle public policy considerations and common
sense in order to decide whether the connection between the cause and the effect is
too remote to establish a claim. Id. at 781, 698 P.2d at 84. Clearly, the courts have been
using the "but for" test of cause in fact, but the concept of legal causation does not
appear to have been raised in workers' compensation cases.
172. Dennis, 109 Wash. 2d at 481, 745 P.2d at 1303.
173. Dennis, 44 Wash. App. at 426-27, 722 P.2d at 1319.
174. The Favor court stated.
We have heretofore pointed out that our workmen's compensation act was not
intended to provide workmen with life, health, or accident insurance at the
expense of the industry in which they are employed. It was intended to
provide, at the expense of the industry employing them, a sure and speedy
relief for workmen (or their dependents) where disability or death resulted
from injuries sustained in the course of their employment or from
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"weeding out" rules so broadly that they wind up preventing
workers with valid claims from getting the benefits to which
they are entitled.175 Yet, the proximate cause standard, cou-
pled with the supreme court's "distinctive conditions" require-
ment, offers the most simple and effective way to exclude
ordinary diseases from coverage without withdrawing benefits
from those disabled by work-related activities.
176
Lance Palmer
occupational diseases arising naturally and proximately from extrahazardous
employment.
Favor v. Department of Labor and Indus., 53 Wash. 2d 698, 703, 336 P.2d 382, 385 (1959)
(citing Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1916)); Sterz v. Industrial
Insurance Comm., 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256 (1916); State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v.
Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101 (1911)).
175. The Department of Labor and Industries has already issued a statement
limiting Dennis to organic conditions. The policy statement, dated January 6, 1988,
reads as follows:
The Dennis case expands coverage for organic occupational disease to
include disability caused by repetitive trauma and aggravation of preexisting
non-occupational diseases. The department does not view this opinion as
having any effect on the adjudication of stress claims.
The opinion reaffirms that not all diseases contracted on the job are
compensable, and that distinctive conditions of employment must be the
proximate cause of the disease or disease-based disability. Distinctive
conditions of employment are recognizable or characteristic risks of a
worker's employment even though similar employments may not have those
risks.
In adjudication of a claim, the department should determine the
following-
1. Whether the disease is a natural consequence of a distinctive
condition of employment; i.e., a natural consequence of a recognizable or
characteristic risk of the worker's work process;
2. Whether the disease is caused by conditions not coincidental to the
employment, i.e., conditions not directly related to the employment;
3. Whether the disease is common to non-employment life and all
employment generally;
4. The proximate cause of the disease.
If it is determined that a natural consequence of a distinctive condition of
employment proximately caused the disease or disease-based disability, the
claim should be allowed. On the other hand, if the disease is proximately
caused by conditions not directly related to the employment, or if the disease
or disease-based disability is common to non-employment life and all
employment generally, the claim is not compensable.
Policy Statement Issued by the Washington Department of Labor and Industries (Jan.
6, 1988). The reader should note that the Department of Labor and Industries is once
again focusing (wrongly) on the disease and not its cause.
176. For example, take the hypothetical case of a nurse who contracts a disabling
case of rubella as a result of working with infected patients. She would not have
become disabled "but for" working with those patients. Contact with rubella
contagion is a distinctive condition of her work that, although present in everyday life
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to some small extent, is present to a great degree in her employment. In contrast,
consider the case of a pizza delivery person who contracts a disabling case of rubella
after drinking from the glass of an infected fellow employee. Can it be said that the
second worker's disability was caused by a distinctive condition of his employment, as
opposed to conditions present in his everyday life, even though the worker would not
have contracted the disability "but for" his work? Clearly not. It is apparent from the
above examples that even under the "distinctive conditions" test, the determination of
compensability is still subject to the prejudice of the decisionmaker. However, the
determination is arguably less subject to bias than decisions based upon older
Washington tests. It should be noted that the delivery person's work activities do not
directly involve being exposed to contagion. In cases where a worker contracts a
disease, but the worker's employment activity did not involve being exposed to the
disease as a matter of course, the worker has an action at law if third party negligence
is involved. See McCarthy v. Department of Labor and Indus., 46 Wash. App. 125, 730
P.2d 681 (1986) (office worker regularly exposed to cigarette smoke had cause of action
against employer for damage arising from her pulmonary problems). See also Kumpf,
Occupational Disease Claims Under the Workers' Compensation Reforms, 12 SErON
HALL L. REV. 470, 472 (1982).
